Comentario a las principales reformas del Proyecto de Ley de Defensa de la Competencia: su racionalidad económica y experiencias en el derecho comparado
Keywords:
defense of competition draft bill, main amendments, economic rationaleAbstract
This article aims to present the main reforms contained in the defense of competition draft bill, showing its rationality and attractiveness, in particular the advantage they have over the rules and institutions currently in force. That is, it seeks to develop not only the typical informative comment about the legislative change, something very useful, of course, but also to explain the rationality of the main reforms, largely based on the experience of comparative law and the analysis of the incentives.
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