¿Algo más sobre la justificación del castigo?
Keywords:
punishment, responsibility, blame, retribution, (anti)punitivism, act requirementAbstract
This paper —originally conceived as a lecture— expounds a group of philosophical concepts and arguments that build up a defense of the intrinsic (non-instrumental) value that may be found in punishment and its institutionalization through criminal law. The paper links Joel Finberg’s analysis of the notion of punishment and Peter Strawson’s conception of responsibility with a version of an argument by Igor Primoratz. It also places defenses of this kind of the value of punishment in relation to radical anti-punitive views, and responds a traditional liberal objection according to which retributive justice justifications of punishment would involve a commitment to punishment for character traits.
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