Morality and Law in the analytical philosophy of Roberto Vernengo

Abstract

This article analyzes a problem present in numerous works by Roberto Vernengo, the relationship between Morals and Law. His study of the problem is characterized by his analytical approach to the logical and linguistic structures of the prescriptive statements of moral and legal discourses. The objective is to determine the type of relationships that can occur between both orders. The presentation begins by showing that the search to sustain a dependence on the Right to Morality, obeys claims of political intervention, whether state or religious, in the sphere of the moral subject. This position is rejected by the author, as it is based on methodologically problematic assumptions, when not, insufficient. In order to show the impertinence of the attributed identity and sub-alternation relations, I return to the analysis that he develops on these prescriptive systems in his Course on General Theory of Law. This work, designed for the classroom, consists of one of the most illuminating lessons on the distinction, in which it is concluded that it is a contingency, whose distinction, both in the strict sense, are mechanisms of social control. The topics analyzed are: the discernible aspects of the different types of statements, the ends pursued by each order and the relative and absolute character attributed to the values.