Estado de necesidad y daño: sobre la distinción entre justificación y excusa

Santiago Truccone Borgogno

Authors

Santiago Truccone Borgogno

Keywords:

necessity as justification, necessity as excuse, harm, legal good, reasons

Abstract

Necessity as justification takes place when the evil that has been avoided is greater than the evil that has been caused. Necessity as excuse takes place when this fact does not occur. In this paper, I will argue that: (a) even if the legal good that has been harmed has an equal rank to the legal good that has been defended, and (b) even if the degree of harm would be –in a sense– equal; it is possible that necessity as a justification should be applied rather than as an excuse. I will contend that when the goods and the degree of harm are identical, the seriousness of harm should be measured considering how strong the reasons against causing such harms to the legal goodare.

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Author Biography

Santiago Truccone Borgogno

Becario Doctoral CONICET; Mg. Derecho Penal (U. Salamanca); Abogado (UNC); Prof. Ayudante de Ética y Prof. Adscripto D. Penal (UNC); Profesor D. Penal I y III (UES21); Investigador Visitante en Universidad de Graz (2015 y 2016); Universidad de Sevilla (2015); Universidad de Salamanca (2013 y 2014). santiagotruccone@gmail.com

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