El relativismo, la objetividad y la justificación moral del derecho en la obra de Vernengo

María Serrana Delgado Manteiga

Authors

María Serrana Delgado Manteiga Universidad de la República (UDELAR)

Keywords:

moral objectivity, relativism, moral absolutism, moral disagreement

Abstract

This article addresses Vernengo’s thoughts on the relationship between law and morality. It starts from the question raised by the author about whether it is possible to make a certain moral relativism compatible with teaching and takes advantage of it to try to justify the possibility of accepting a certain form of relativism that is compatible with moral objectivity (the possibility of moral error) and with another way of understanding the links between law and morality, where the justification of law is a moral justification, with certain particular characteristics related to its institutional nature and its possibility of solving decision-making impasses resulting from the deep moral disagreements expe-rienced by contemporary democratic societies.

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Author Biography

María Serrana Delgado Manteiga, Universidad de la República (UDELAR)

Universidad de la República (UDELAR) (Uruguay). ORCID: 0000-0001-8888-8160. Correo electrónico: se-rranadelgadom@gmail.com

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